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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2003, the central government of the People's
Republic of China and the government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region signed the Closer Economic Partnership
Arrangement (CEPA).' Then, on October 17, 2003, with the
same title and almost the same contents, the Chinese central
t PhD (Edinburgh University, UK), Professor of Law, Shanghai Jiao Tong
University. No. 800, Dong Chuan Road, Min Hang District, Shanghai, P. R. China,
200240. Email: jiaxianghu@hotmail.com. I am deeply grateful to Professor Dar-
ren Rosenblum of Pace University School of Law for his helpful recommendations
and the previous Editor-in-Chief, Nikki Feit, of Pace International Law Review for
her careful editing of this article. However, the responsibility for any possible er-
rors is still mine.
1 Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement
(CEPA), P.R.C.-H.K., June 29, 2003 translated at http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/
cepa/legaltext/fulltext.html [hereinafter Hong Kong CEPA]; Mainland and Macao
Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), P.R.C.-Mac., Oct. 17, 2003
translated at http://www.economia.gov.mo/page/english/cepa-e.htm [hereinafter
Macao CEPA]. Please note that there are no official English versions of these doc-
uments. See http://www.zhuhai-trade.gov.cn/cepa/ (Chinese version). The titles
are translated into English by the author.
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government signed a similar agreement, Closer Economic Part-
nership Arrangement (CEPA),2 with the government of Macao
Special Administrative Region.3 Both arrangements have been
in effect since January 1, 2004. These two documents indicate a
substantial step to further integrate the economies of mainland
China, Hong Kong, and Macao. After China entered the World
Trade Organization (WTO) on December 11, 2001, 4 the two
CEPA agreements have aroused much attention from both the
academic and business circles, particularly regarding their ef-
fects on economic development in these three areas. Further-
more, the issue of whether the rules in the CEPA agreements
are in conformity with the provisions of the WTO agreements
also merits attention. In the following sections, the author ex-
amines the CEPA agreements, particularly Articles 7 and 8, as
they apply to the 1994 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 5 the Anti-dumping Agreement, 6 and the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.7
II. A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW OF THE TRADE RELATIONS
BETWEEN MAINLAND CHINA, HONG KONG, AND MACAO
Since mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao have all ob-
tained full membership in the WTO, the current trade relations
among them are regulated not only by bilateral agreements like
CEPA, but also by the WTO agreements. The WTO has both
2 Macao CEPA, supra note 1.
3 Id.
4 See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization,
Apr. 15, 1995, 33 I.L.M. 1125, 1144, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 11 (Cambridge
Univ. Press 1999) (hereinafter WTO Agreement). Hong Kong and Macao acceded
to the WTO as original Members in 1994 under Article XI of the WTO Agreement.
See id.
5 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194
[hereinafter GATT].
6 Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994, in Annex 1A of Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1995, reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URU-
GUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 147 (Cam-
bridge Univ. Press 1999) (hereinafter Anti-Dumping Agreement).
7 See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in Annex 1A of
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1995,
reprinted in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGO-
TIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 231 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) (hereinafter Agree-
ment on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures).
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sovereign States and separate customs territories as its Mem-
bers, a fact which can be traced back to the GATT history.
When the original General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) was signed in 1947, there were only twenty-three signa-
tories." Many countries, before they gained full independence,
were the colonies of western powers. They became GATT con-
tracting parties with the sponsorship of their suzerain States
under Article XXXIII of GATT 1947, which states:
A government not party to this Agreement, or a government act-
ing on behalf of a separate customs territory possessing full au-
tonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations and of
the other matters provided for in this Agreement, may accede to
this Agreement, on its own behalf or on behalf of that territory, on
terms to be agreed between such government and the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES. Decisions of the CONTRACTING PAR-
TIES under this paragraph shall be taken by a two-thirds
majority.9
Among this group of GATT "contracting parties" are Hong Kong
and Macao. 10
According to the Sino-British Joint Declaration, 1 signed
December 19, 1984, after the Chinese government resumed the
exercise of sovereignty over Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, "[t]he
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will retain the status
of a free port and a separate customs territory."12 The Declara-
tion further states that "[ulsing the name of 'Hong Kong,
China', the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region may on
its own maintain and develop economic and cultural relations
and conclude relevant agreements with States, regions and rel-
evant international organizations."1 3 These principles are reaf-
8 See GATT, supra note 5. In his book, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, James Crawford made an estimate that shortly before World War II,
there were only about seventy-five States on the earth. See JAMES CRAWFORD, THE
CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (Oxford Univ. Press 1979).
9 See GATT, supra note 5, at art. XXXIII.
10 Hong Kong and Macao became GATT separate territories under the spon-
sorship of United Kingdom and Portugal, their former suzerain States.
11 The Joint Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China
and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
on the Question of Hong Kong, Dec. 19, 1984, translated at http://www.info.gov.hk-
trans/jd/jd2.htm [hereinafter the Sino-British Joint Declaration].
12 Id. at Point 3(6).
13 Id. at Point 3(10).
3
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firmed in similar words in Article 116 of the Basic Law of the
Hong Kong. 14
On April 13, 1987, the Chinese government and the Portu-
guese government signed the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declara-
tion. 15 Point 2(8) of the Declaration stipulates that after the
Chinese government resumes the exercise of sovereignty over
Macao on December 20, 1999, "[t]he Macao Special Administra-
tive Region will remain a free port and a separate customs terri-
tory in order to develop its economic activities."16 The
Declaration further states that "[u]sing the name 'Macao,
China', the Macao Special Administrative Region may, on its
own, maintain and develop economic and cultural relations and
in this context conclude agreements with States, regions and
relevant international organizations."1 7 Similar wording can
also be found in Article 112 of the Basic Law of the Macao.18
Before China became a full member of the WTO, trade reg-
ulations between mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao were
different from trade relations between China and other coun-
tries. In other words, Hong Kong and Macao received more
preferential treatment than other countries under the Chinese
domestic law. As China was "poised to finalize its WTO acces-
sion process, some small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in
Hong Kong feared that they would lose their competitive edge
over foreign companies once China's market fully opened up."' 9
Therefore, the SME's pressed the Chinese central government
and the governments of Hong Kong and Macao to maintain this
special preferential treatment even after China entered the
14 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, April 4, 1990, available at http://www.info.gov.hk/basic-
law/fulltext/content0205.htm [hereinafter The Basic Law of Hong Kong].
15 The Joint Declaration of the People's Republic of China and the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Portugal on the Question of Macao, Apr. 13, 1987, trans-
lated at http://www.imprensa.macau.gov.mo/bo/i/88/23/dc/en [hereinafter The
Sino-Portuguese Declaration].
16 Id. at Point 2(8).
17 Id. at Point 2(7).
18 The Basic Law of the Macao Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic of China, Mar. 31, 1993, translated at http://www.imprensa.macau.gov
.mo/bo/i1999leibasica/indexuk.asp [hereinafter The Basic Law of Macao].
19 Henry S. Gao, Legal Issues under WTO Rules on the Closer Economic Part-
nership Arrangement (CEPA) Between Mainland China and Hong Kong, 2 CHI-
NESE J. INT'L L. 629 (2003).
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WTO. 20 After a series of high-level meetings over one and a
half years, the final results are the two CEPA agreements be-
tween mainland China and Hong Kong and Macao.
III. LEGAL STATUS OF THE CEPA AGREEMENTS
As a general rule, the WTO requires that "each Member
shall ensure the conformity of its law, regulations and adminis-
trative procedures with its obligations as provided in the an-
nexed Agreements."2 1 The WTO uses GATT's Article I (General
Most-Favored-Nation Treatment)22 and Article III (National
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation) 23 as the cor-
nerstones of the current world trade regime.24 However, the
WTO rules are not a monolithic bloc, impermeable to change.
GATT Article XXIV provides exceptions for WTO Members to
form customs unions and free trade areas in which the constitu-
ent members may derogate from the WTO rules by offering
more preferential treatment to each other.25
20 Id.
21 WTO Agreement, supra note 4, at art. XVI(4).
22 GATT, supra note 5, at art. I. As a general rule, the first paragraph of
Article I provides that:
With respect to customs duties and charges of any kind imposed on or in
connection with importation or exportation or imposed on the interna-
tional transfer of payments for imports or exports, and with respect to the
method of levying such duties and charges, and with respect to all rules
and formalities in connection with importation and exportation, and with
respect to all matters referred to in paragraphs 2 and 4 of Article III, any
advantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party
to any product originating in or destined for any other country shall be
accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating
in or destined for the territories of all other contracting parties.
Id.
23 Id. at art. III. The core provision of this article is the first paragraph, which
provides that:
The contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal
charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal
sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of
products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture,
processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should
not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection
to domestic production.
Id.
24 Jeremy R. Regal, Russia in the WTO: How Russia's Institutional Idiosyn-
crasies May Impede Its Ability to Abide by the WTO's Governing Cornerstones, 9
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 97, 108 (2004).
25 Id. at art. XXIV.
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According to GATT Article XXIV, a customs union:
• . .shall be understood to mean the substitution of a single cus-
toms territory for two or more customs territories so that:
(i) duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce (except,
where necessary, those permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII,
XIV, XV and XX) are eliminated with respect to substantially all
the trade between the constituent territories of the union or at
least with respect to substantially all the trade in products
originating in such territories, and
(ii) subject to the provisions of paragraph 9, substantially the
same duties and other regulations of commerce are applied by
each of the members of the union to the trade of territories not
included in the union. 26
A free trade area "shall be understood to mean a group of two or
more customs territories in which the duties and other restric-
tive regulations of commerce (except, where necessary, those
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX) are
eliminated on substantially all the trade between the constitu-
ent territories in products originating in such territories. ' '27
These provisions are the legal source for various economic co-
operations, both bilateral and regional.
The CEPA agreements each contain a main text, six an-
nexes, and one schedule. Each covers not only those traditional
issues of trade in goods, but also relatively new issues such as
service and investment. The most substantial part of each of
the two documents is that which states that Hong Kong and
Macao agree to bind their existing zero import tariff regimes
with respect to all goods from mainland China. 28 In return,
mainland China agrees to apply a zero import tariff for imports
from Hong Kong and Macao beginning January 1, 2004.29 This
treatment applies to specific items, which are specified in An-
nex 1 of each agreement. 30 Mainland China also agreed to ap-
ply a zero import tariff to those imports from Hong Kong and
Macao that are not included in the Annex by January 1, 2006.31
26 Id. at art. XXIV(8).
27 Id.
28 Hong Kong CEPA and Macao CEPA, supra note 1, at art. 5(1).
29 Id. at art. 5(2).
30 Id. at art. 5(2), Annex 1, tbl. 1 (including inter alia, antibiotics, perfumes,
make-up, clothing, watches and clocks, and ice cream).
31 Id. at art. 5(3).
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According to Article 11 and Annex 4 of each agreement, main-
land China has promised to gradually ease and ultimately elim-
inate restrictions on the services provided by Hong Kong and
Macao businessmen. 32 Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Ma-
cao have agreed to further promote their investment facilita-
tion.3 3 Therefore, the two CEPA agreements are in nature free
trade agreements rather than customs union agreements, for
they do not mandate mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao
to apply uniform duties and other restrictive regulations to ter-
ritories that do not join the WTO.
Through the formation of the CEPA agreements, the Chi-
nese government hoped to assure businessmen and entrepre-
neurs in Hong Kong and Macao that they would not lose the
preferential treatment from mainland China even after China
entered the WTO. Nevertheless, whether fulfilling the expecta-
tions of Hong Kong and Macao interferes with China's obliga-
tions under the WTO remains debatable.
IV. CONTROVERSIAL RULES IN THE CEPA AGREEMENTS
Examined superficially, the CEPA agreements contain no
rules that conflict with the WTO rules. GATT Article XXIV per-
mits, with the exception of those measures under Articles XI,
XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX, that a WTO Member may eliminate
any restrictive measures to its constituent members in a cus-
toms union or free trade area.34 Therefore, Articles 6 and 7 of
the CEPA agreements seem blameless in mandating that main-
land China, Hong Kong, and Macao will not take anti-dumping
and countervailing measures against the imports from each
other.35 But the issue is not so simple. If we read GATT Article
XXIV carefully, we find that the constituent members in a free
trade area are precluded from levying higher duties or exercis-
ing more restrictive measures than those existing prior to the
formation of the free trade area against those WTO Members
not included therein.3 6 As WTO Members have recognized, the
purpose of a free trade area "should be to facilitate trade be-
32 Id. at art. 11, Annex 4.
33 Id. at arts. 16, 17.
34 GATT, supra note 5, at art. XXIV:4.
35 Hong Kong CEPA and Macao CEPA, supra note 1, at arts. 6,7.
36 GATT, supra note 5, at art. XXIV.
7
PACE INT'L L. REV.
tween the constituent territories and not raise barriers to the
trade of other contracting parties with such territories.'"3 7
Theoretically, two situations might arise after the forma-
tion of a free trade area. First, the general tariffs might be in-
creased and more restrictive measures exercised against the
non-constituent members. We regard the tariffs in this situa-
tion as absolutely higher and the measures as absolutely more
restrictive compared with those existing before the formation of
the free trade area. This situation, however, has already been
forbidden by the WTO rules. 38
A second situation might be one where the existing level of
tariffs and the restrictive measures to the non-constituent
members do not change, but the tariffs applied within the con-
stituent members have been lowered significantly and the re-
strictive measures greatly eased. Consequently, the tariffs to
those non-constituent members have been raised comparatively
and the measures comparatively more restrictive. In the context
of the CEPA agreements, to eliminate the anti-dumping and
countervailing measures would mean that the exporters in the
respective constituent members will not meet any restrictions,
including anti-dumping and countervailing measures, despite
whether these measures, are necessary in some unusual circum-
stances. This is unfair to many enterprises both inside and
outside the constituent members, as they have been deprived of
the opportunity to sue these exporters for their unfair trade ei-
ther as the complainant or third party.
Anti-dumping and countervailing measures are popular
practices by which an importing country tries to protect its do-
mestic industry from the dumping of foreign low-price prod-
ucts.3 9 In order to avoid the abuse of these measures, GATT
Article VI:6(a) mandates that:
37 Id. (emphasis added).
38 GATT, supra note 5, at art. XXIV:5(a).
39 In the context of the WTO, the terms "country" or "countries" as used in the
WTO Agreement and the Multilateral Trade Agreements are to be understood to
include any separate customs territory Member. In the case of a separate customs
territory Members of the WTO, where an expression in the WTO Agreement and
the Multilateral Trade Agreements is qualified by the term "national," such ex-
pression shall be read as pertaining to that customs territory, unless otherwise
specified. See WTO Agreement, supra note 4, at art. VXI.
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[nIo contracting party shall levy any anti-dumping or counter-
vailing duty on the importation of any product of the territory of
another contracting party unless it determines that the effect of the
dumping or subsidization, as the case may be, is such as to cause
or threaten material injury to an established domestic industry, or
is such as to retard materially the establishment of a domestic
industry.40
Therefore, WTO Members are permitted to use anti-dumping
and countervailing measures only in some special
circumstances.
CEPA Articles 6 and 7, however, have touched the other
side of this issue: whether the total elimination of anti-dumping
and countervailing measures in free trade agreements is com-
mendable. The abuse of anti-dumping and countervailing mea-
sures overlooks the comparative advantages existing in
different countries and jeopardizes normal international trade
relations. The same result applies to the practice of eliminating
the anti-dumping and countervailing measures. This is because
dumping/subsidy practices in nature aim at dominating the
market of the importing country and gaining the predatory
profits. This is the legal base for the use of anti-dumping and
countervailing measures.
In order to give an objective appraisal in a WTO anti-dump-
ing or countervailing litigation, a panel or Appellate Body is re-
quired to consider the statements of both the disputing parties
and any relevant third party.41 Article 6(1) of the Anti-Dump-
ing Agreement states: "[a] 11 interested parties in an anti-dump-
ing investigation shall be given notice of the information which
the authorities require and ample opportunity to present in
writing all evidence which they consider relevant in respect of
the investigation in question."42 Article 6(2) further states:
"[tlhroughout the anti-dumping investigation all interested par-
ties shall have a full opportunity for the defense of their inter-
ests. To this end, the authorities shall, on request, provide
opportunities for all interested parties to meet those parties
with adverse interests, so that opposing views may be presented
40 GATT, supra note 5, at art. VI (emphasis added).
41 Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 6(1).
42 Id.
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and rebuttal arguments offered."43 Similar provisions can also
be found in Article 12 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Coun-
tervailing Measures.44 Neither the wording of the above provi-
sions nor the practice of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) indicates that the "interested parties" should be limited
to the disputing parties. In other words, all relevant parties
upon which the settlement of a dispute might have some effect
can be regarded as the "interested parties," with the right to
participate in a dispute settlement process and to defend their
own interests. To eliminate the possibility of settling disputes
through litigation is, de facto, to take away their right to defend
their own interests.
The same reasoning can also be found in the Dispute Set-
tlement Understanding. 45 Article 10(1) states that "[t]he inter-
ests of the parties to a dispute and those of other Members under
covered agreements at issue in the dispute shall be fully taken
into account during the panel process." 46 Article 10(2) further
states:
[alny Member having a substantial interest in a matter before a
panel and having notified its interest to the DSB [Dispute Settle-
ment Body] (referred to in this Understanding as a 'third party')
shall have an opportunity to be heard by the panel and to make
written submissions to the panel. These submissions shall also be
given to the parties to the dispute and shall be reflected in the
panel report. 47
Two points may be drawn from the above provisions. First, any
WTO Member, if it deems necessary, has the right to partici-
pate in an on-going panel process. 48 Second, in such a circum-
stance, the panel has the obligation to take the request of third
parties into the panel examination. 49 In some circumstances, a
43 Id. at art. 6(2) (emphasis added).
44 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 7, at art. 12.
45 Dispute Settlement Understanding, in Annex 2 of Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1995, reprinted in THE RE.
SULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL
TEXTS (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999) [hereinafter Dispute Settlement
Understanding].
46 Id. at art. 10(1).
47 Id. at art. 10(2).
48 See id.
49 See id.
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third country can request the authorities of the importing coun-
try to take anti-dumping action on its behalf, although the deci-
sion whether or not to proceed with a case rests with the
importing country.50 All these provisions indicate that the right
and interest of a third party in a dispute settlement should not
be ignored.
Additionally, private parties are not qualified to bring their
complaints to the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).51 In
general, if a domestic industry determines that its benefits have
been impaired or impeded by imports, which are either at a
lower-than-normal price or with some subsidization, the domes-
tic industry can only refer the matter to the relevant authori-
ties.52 If the situation is serious enough, the relevant
authorities shall, on behalf of the injured industry, bring the
complaint to the DSB. 53 The fact that Articles 6 and 7 of the
CEPA agreements prohibit the initiation of anti-dumping and
countervailing litigation between mainland China and Hong
Kong or Macao is essentially the equivalent of any industry in
these three areas losing the opportunity to refer complaints to
the relevant authorities. This is true even when the industry
has been seriously injured by the dumped imports or imports
with some subsidization from the exporting authorities.
Obviously, the CEPA agreements have some loopholes. The
Chinese government and the governments of Hong Kong and
Macao may focus so much attention on the continuation of their
closer relations after China's accession to the WTO that they
inadvertently deprive the interests of other WTO Members. At
the moment, there are two practicable ways to close these loop-
holes. One is to amend Articles 6 and 7 of the CEPA agree-
ments, making the anti-dumping and countervailing litigation
available among mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao. The
three governments may agree on more restrictive rules on the
initiation of anti-dumping and countervailing measures. The
second solution is to establish a uniform institution to deal with
the complaints involving dumping and subsidy issues from both
50 See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 6, at art. 14.
51 See generally Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 46; see also
Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 6.
52 See Anti-Dumping Agreement, supra note 6.
53 Id.
11
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the constituent members of the CEPA agreements and other
WTO Members.
Because the CEPA agreements' provisions are in conflict
with the WTO practices, the following question has been raised:
should the current WTO rules, inter alia GATT Article VI and
the Anti-dumping Agreement, be amended so that the elimina-
tion of anti-dumping and countervailing measures will become
a mandatory prohibition? The answer to this question should
be in the affirmative. Nevertheless, in view of the complexity of
the amendment process, 54 the most practicable way is to estab-
lish this proposition through the WTO dispute settlement prac-
tices. Only under this consideration can the "proper balance
between the rights and obligations of Members" be
maintained. 55
The provisions of CEPA have also reminded us of the over-
debated issue of how to deal with the challenge of globalization
versus regionalization in the context of WTO, which will be ex-
plained below.
V. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A REGIONAL
TRADE ARRANGEMENT
Early in the 1950s, shortly after the GATT was signed,
some economists adopted a rather skeptical attitude towards
the benefits of regional trading. In 1950, Jacob Viner drew the
distinction between trade creation (additional trade created
through establishing a customs union) and trade diversion
(trade being diverted from an efficient producer outside the
union to a less efficient producer in a Member country).56 This
theory about customs unions found that the overall welfare ben-
efit to Member countries depended on the degree of trade crea-
tion, as opposed to trade diversion. 57 As regional integration
increased the efficiency of an external tariff, the competitive po-
sition of a customs union would improve at the expense of the
rest of the world.58 Therefore, the overall impact of regional in-
54 See WTO Agreement, supra note 4, at art. X.
55 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 45, at art. 3(3).
56 JACOB VINER, THE CUSTOMS UNION ISSUE (Carnegie Endowment for Inter-
national Peace 1950).
57 Id.
58 Id.
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tegration is at best ambivalent.5 9 With the proliferation of free
trade areas since the 1960s, Viner's skepticism about the likely
welfare benefits of customs unions gradually gave way to a pop-
ular opinion among economists that regional trade blocs gener-
ally creates, rather than diverts, trade.
Among the proponents of regional trading arrangements
are prominent figures, including Gary Sampson, the former De-
velopment Division Director of the WTO. In his article Regional
Trading Arrangements and the Multilateral Trading System,
60
Sampson states:
With a successful conclusion of the [Uruguay] Round, it is fair to
speculate that the growth in regionalism--operating in accor-
dance with GATT obligations--has at least the potential to
strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system. The
surge of regionalism parallels and complements a rapid expansion
in GATT's membership as evidenced by the fact that 28 countries
are now in the process of accession to GATT... In short, provided
that regionalism remains open--and the rules and procedures of
the GATT offer the only generally available means of ensuring
that it does--there is no reason why regional trade agreements
and multilateral system should not continue to be mutually
supportive. 6 1
What Sampson cherishes sounds plausible in theory, but unat-
tainable in practice. When Article XXIV of GATT 1947 was
drafted as the exemptions to the general principle of non-dis-
crimination among GATT contracting parties, it was deemed
that there should be some strict rules adhered to it.62 For ex-
ample, Article XXIV(7)(a) requires:
[a]ny contracting party deciding to enter into a customs union or
free trade area, or an interim agreement leading to the formation
of such a union or area, shall promptly notify the CON-
TRACTING PARTIES and shall make available to them such in-
formation regarding the proposed union or area as will enable
59 Id.
60 Gary Sampson, Regional Trading Arrangements and the Multilateral Trad-
ing System, in REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS, MULTILATERALISM AND THE GATT: COMPLE-
MENTARY PATHS TO FREE TRADE? 17-18 (Till Geiger & Dennis Kennedy eds., 1996).
61 Id.
62 See GATT 1947, supra note 5, at art. XXIV(7)(a).
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them to make such reports and recommendations to contracting
parties as they may deem appropriate. 63
However, this provision is neither clear nor operable based on
both procedural and substantive issues.
Procedurally, different views may arise with respect to
when notification of a regional trade agreement should occur,
whether: (i) at the conclusion of negotiations, (ii) when the
agreement is signed, (iii) when it is ratified, or (iv) when it en-
ters into force. In most cases, an international agreement may
enter into force only after it is signed by the governments of its
participants, ratified by their legislative bodies, or even ap-
proved by a referendum. If the notification process occurs prior
to entry into force, then the examination body of the WTO will
review the agreements which might be rejected eventually by
one or more of the participants involved. Alternatively, if agree-
ments are examined only after a protracted and perhaps diffi-
cult process of domestic legislative approval, the prospect of
amending an agreement to reflect the concerns of the WTO
Members will present its own difficulties.
Apart from the apparent procedural problems like the one
mentioned above, there are also more substantial issues which
merit our concern. Regional trading arrangements are often re-
garded by scholars as the faster way to liberalize international
trade, as trade tariffs are lowered further among the partici-
pants of these arrangements. 64 But, these scholars overlook the
fact that tariff barriers in these regional blocs have been raised
comparably for non-participants. According to Jacob Viner, two
opposite forces would result from the creation of a customs
union: (1) a trade-creating force generated by the elimination of
protection of domestic producers against their counterparts in
other countries in the union and (2) a trade-diverting force re-
sulting from the preferential access granted to partner coun-
tries in the union vis-&-vis more efficient third country
producers. 65 Therefore, regional trading arrangements in a cus-
toms union look like a double-edged sword: they embody both
63 Id.
64 See Stephen Woolcock, Regional Integration and the Multilateral Trading
System, in REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS, MULTILATERALISM AND THE GATT: COMPLE-
MENTARY PATHS TO FREE TRADE? 115 (Till Geiger & Dennis Kennedy eds., 1996).
65 VINER, supra note 56.
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free trade and protection since they are inherently preferential
and discriminatory.
The situation for the free trade area is no better than that
of the customs unions, particularly in the context of those free
trade areas with preconditions for their membership. For ex-
ample, taking the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA), Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, in his article, The
Agenda of the WTO, states that the passage of NAFTA was sub-
ject to Mexico's acceptance of the supplemental agreements on
environmental and labor standards. 66 As Professor Bhagwati
asserts, this is just the "wrong way to go."67 As free trade re-
quires no preconditions, why should the regional trading agree-
ments require preconditions as in the case of NAFTA? If it is
proper to impose such prior conditions for some participants to
join a free trade area, then we would have to revise all our text-
books of international economics which tell us that, regardless
of what other countries' policies are, we shall generally profit
from freeing of trade in a non-discriminatory fashion. There-
fore, the demands imposed on Mexico could have been success-
fully resisted, as they were in the GATT and now as they are in
the WTO. 68 However, in view of the overall interests, the Mexi-
can administration had to accept these prior conditions, as this
situation resulted from a superpower bargaining one-on-one
with a vastly inferior power. In turn, this has strengthened the
environmental and labor lobbies' argument that because
NAFTA required these preconditions, so must the WTO. In
short, NAFTA has made negotiations in the WTO more com-
plex, not less.
In her article The Triumph of Regionalism over Globalism:
Patterns of Trade in the Interwar Period, Patricia Clavin gives
us another perspective on the potential threat of regional trade
blocs to the world economy. 69 During the Great Depression, the
66 Jagdish Bhagwati, The Agenda of the WTO, in CHALLENGES TO THE NEW
WORLD TRADE ORGANISATION (Pitou van Dijick & Gerrit Faber eds., 1996).
67 Id.
68 Whether the result will really benefit developing countries remains debata-
ble, the recently finished WTO Ministerial Conferences have shown that develop-
ing countries have begun to use their combined force in the WTO to argue on some
significant issues with the developed countries.
69 Patricia Clavin, The Triumph of Regional over Globalism: Patterns of Trade
in the Interwar Period, in REGIONAL TRADE BLOCS, MULTILATERALISM AND THE
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world's leading capitalist countries - United States, Britain and
France - failed to cooperate in efforts to combat the Depression
because their different analyses of the causes of the Depression,
coupled with the priority of national politics, left them little
common ground. 70 Although viable internationalist-oriented
initiatives to save the world economy were proposed, there was
a lack of political will to make them work. Instead, countries
like National Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy, governed by
regimes who argued that conflicts in the political economy could
be eliminated, came to pose the gravest threat to capitalist lib-
eral democracy.7 ' In the build-up to the Second World War, the
lack of cooperation among the sterling and franc regions, and
the troubled history of trade negotiations, left the capitalist
economies more vulnerable than the axis opponents, in prepara-
tions on the road to war.72
In Clavin's view, the Peace Treaties of Versailles, concluded
in 1919, helped to underline the divisions between European
powers, by encouraging States to protect national interests
through the adoption and promotion of regional ties.73 Despite
the fact that the nineteenth-century "age of imperialism" ap-
peared to have passed, the peace settlement worked to extend
the territorial boundaries of the British and French empires;
while the White Dominions (Canada, New Zealand and Austra-
lia) secured self-government, the popularity of notions of impe-
rial economic interdependence among right-wing political
groups continued.74 Although the diminution of Germany's sta-
tus as a great power, coupled with the "cuts in its national
flesh," served to limit German influence and custom in Eastern
Europe during the early 1920s, 75 by the 1930s, German eco-
nomic penetration of Eastern Europe had returned in an ag-
gressive form. 76 In fact, particular members of German society
were not alone in looking on with envious eyes at the continued
GATT: COMPLEMENTARY PATHS TO FREE TRADE? 33 (Till Geiger & Dennis Kennedy
eds., 1996).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See id.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
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imperial ties enjoyed by Britain and France. 77 The apparent ec-
onomic and strategic benefits enjoyed by the "have" imperial
powers encouraged the drive for similar advantages by the
"have not" powers, which were as diverse as Japan, the pro-
moter of co-prosperity across Southeast Asia and Italy, where
there was a drive to conquer the Mediterranean. 78 Even the
United States, aloof to these imperial pretensions and disdain-
ful of others' resort to Empire in the 1930s, nevertheless was
motivated to strengthen its ties within its own American eco-
nomic backdoor, both to the North and to the South.79
Although the present fragmentation of regional trade blocs
are not as threatening to the world economic structure as they
were in the 1930s, no one can assure us that similar tragedies
will not reoccur. Thus, in preparing the Uruguay Round of mul-
tilateral trade negotiations, many prominent scholars and
others advocated to make GATT obligations, relating to re-
gional trading agreements, stricter and more precise. Accord-
ing to the work of an eminent study group, many existing
regional integration arrangements:
fall far short of the (GATT) requirements. The exceptions and am-
biguities which have thus been permitted have seriously weak-
ened the trade rules, and made it very difficult to resolve disputes
(to which GATT obligations are relevant). They have set a danger-
ous precedent for further special deals, fragmentation of the trad-
ing system, and damage to the trade interests of non-participants
... GATT rules on customs unions and free trade areas should be
examined, redefined so as to avoid ambiguity, and more strictly
applied.80
Despite long-standing recognition of the lack of GATT obliga-
tions and due procedures relating to regional trading arrange-
ments, the effort of the Uruguay Round negotiators in
improving matters in this area was modest at best. Therefore, a
fundamental revision of WTO rules and procedures concerning
regional trade arrangements should be well appreciated.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 39-40.
80 Fritz Leutwiler et al., Trade Policies for a Better Future, Report to the Di-
rector-General (Geneva: GATT Secreteriat, 1985).
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VI. CONCLUSION
There has already been a significant amount of published
literature dealing with the regulation of anti-dumping and
countervailing measures."' The CEPA has brought a new per-
spective on the issues. Article 3(2) of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding provides that "one of the functions of the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism is to clarify the existing provi-
sions of those multilateral agreements."8 2 Following this vein,
the WTO panels and the Appellate Body "are obliged to adjudi-
cate disputes arising from WTO Members, even when involving
the interpretation of the most obscure provisions of the WTO
agreements, and to do so in an objective manner." 3 Among
these "obscure provisions" are those WTO rules on anti-dump-
ing and countervailing measures. Hopefully, the views ex-
pressed in this Comment will be taken into account when a
dispute involving the elimination of anti-dumping and counter-
vailing measures arises.
81 See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Evidence, Proof and Persuasion in WTO Dispute
Settlement: Who Bears the Burden?, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 227 (1998); A. W. Shoyer,
The First Three Years of WTO Dispute Settlement: Observations and Suggestions, 1
J. INT'L ECON. L. 277 (1998); Aluisio de Lima-Campos, Nineteen Proposals to Curb
Abuse in Anti-dumping and Countervailing Duty Proceedings, 39 J. WORLD TRADE
239 (2005).
82 Dispute Settlement Understanding, supra note 45, at art. 3(2).
83 Jiaxiang Hu, The Role of International Law in the Development of WTO
Law, 1 J. INT'L ECON. L. 143 (2004).
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